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ABSTRACT 
Large, complex projects can identify a significant 
number and variety of risks, throughout the project life 
cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or 
accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or 
accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of 
their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes 
some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. 
The ability to track and effectively communicate this 
aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project 
management. 
 There have been previous attempts to create a schema 
to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without 
notable success. Most of these attempts have centered 
on some additive metric derived from the scoring of 
likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of 
itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores 
were then aggregated to a level where all context was 
lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create 
linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which 
useful aggregation could then occur.  
The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering 
(MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities 
to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an 
underlying layer that links data items to each other. 
Objectives link to requirements, which then link to 
functions, functions to physical architecture items, and 
so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it 
started with a focus on modeling requirements based on 
things like use cases, efforts are now underway to 
integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) 
information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, 
called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is 
yielding models that are more useful and are a more 
accurate representations of the systems.  
MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, 
provide a new means of tracking and communicating 
aggregate risks.  In the proposed method, risks are 
added into the models as distinct items, having 
attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the 
likelihood and consequence values as charted on the 
standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, 
each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which 
may include both a current score and potential post-
mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked 
to elements of the model, such as system 
objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical 
architecture items, with “Risk to” relationships. These 
risks will then be communicated by use of reports 
generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or 
hazards linked to model elements. These reports can 
include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring 
and potential future state scoring based on the planned 
mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all 
risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project 
objectives or requirements. When run as part of an 
upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will 
serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate 
to the effected portion of the system. When included as 
part of periodic program or project reviews, risk 
reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve 
the overall understanding of the system’s true risk 
posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of 
the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, 
with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing 
the model environment also enables a near constant 
access to current state of aggregate risks. 
1. PROJECTS AND RISK
All projects include some amount of uncertainty. That 
uncertainty can come as a benefit, as an opportunity to 
increase performance or safety, or reduce cost or 
schedule needs. Uncertainty can also come as a threat or 
risk. Risks can impact a project’s schedule, budget, 
performance, and safety. Despite all best efforts at 
planning and foresight, no project can predict at the 
outset all of the risks they may encounter throughout the 
entire lifecycle. It is for this reason that NASA, like 
many other engineering organizations, employs risk 
management techniques to identify, track, communicate, 
and mitigate these items as they are uncovered.  
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1.1 Typical NASA risk management 
NASA’s standard process for Risk Management is 
described in NPR 8000.4B, “Agency Risk Management 
Procedural Requirements”. It includes both the high-
level concept of Risk-Informed Decision Making 
(RIDM), and the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) 
process used to populate the data required for RIDM. 
RIDM itself involves the Identification, Analysis, and 
Risk-Informed Selection of Alternatives. The CRM 
process is a structured approach to Identify, Analyze, 
Plan, Track, and Control risks.  
 
 
Figure 1: NASA's Continuous Risk Management cycle 
from NPR 8000.4B 
 
NASA Programs and Projects are required to draft and 
follow a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that details their 
specific implementation of the NPR 8000.4B 
requirements, including the roles and responsibilities, 
how the risk data is to be managed, and such details as 
how often risk meetings or boards will be held. 
 
In a typical project environment, risks can be identified 
by any team member or stakeholder. The project’s RMP 
will describe the process by which these risks are 
researched, vetted, and approved for inclusion into the 
project’s tracking system. This process includes an 
initial scoring of the likelihood, L, and consequence of 
occurrence, C. During the ensuing reviews, teams may 
identify potential mitigation steps and what impact 
completing those mitigations steps may have on the L x 
C scoring. The project’s RMP will also include a set of 
criteria used to determine when a risk can be closed. 
This typically occurs when a project determines that the 
resulting risk likelihood or consequence of occurrence is 
below a level of concern. As an example, a project may 
define its closure level to be once any risk’s L x C 
scoring drops below a 2 x 3.  
 
There are times when it is not feasible to mitigate a risk 
to the defined closure levels, either due to technical 
capability, cost, or schedule. In these cases, if NASA 
and the project wish to proceed, they will consider 
accepting the risk as it is. Hence, the difference between 
closing a risk and accepting a risk is a vital concept. 
Closing occurs when a project no longer considers the 
risk to be of concern, while accepting means that there 
is some negative uncertainty associated with the project 
choosing to go forward with the risk as is.  
 
 
Figure 2: Typical regular risk review report 
 
Projects review their open risks at some defined 
interval, usually every two to four weeks. Fig. 2 shows 
one format of risk report projects use to communicate 
their risks to the team, including current scoring (LxC), 
and trending. As a rule, projects only review open risks 
on a frequent basis, not those closed or accepted. 
 
In addition to these regular risk reviews, NPR 
8000.4B[1] requires periodic review of accepted risks. 
In most cases, this becomes an annual review where 
team members and stakeholders determine if there have 
been any changes that might either impact the risk 
scoring, or its circumstances. For example, if there has 
been a major architecture change on the project that 
eliminates the consequence of the risk, they may choose 
to reopen and address. A change may call into question 
the logic of accepting the remaining risk. In practice, 
these reviews tend to be a cursory flip-through of the 
accepted risks, lacking detail about potential linked 
concerns.  
 
One limitation of the current state of risk reviews is that 
risks are often viewed as distinct and individual items. 
Which risks are reviewed on any particular occasion 
may be based upon which ones have had recent updates. 
When reviewed individually like this, it can be difficult 
to understand what the additive impact of the risk is on 
the project as a whole. This incremental impact to the 
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 project is even more important to understand when 
making the decision whether it is reasonable to accept 
the risk, or pursue more mitigation.  
 
1.2 Growing importance of Risk Management 
amid the shift away from requirements 
Through the many decades of NASA projects, teams 
began to identify common, or repeating risks. This often 
led to the creation of a requirement, or set of 
requirements, intended to mitigate future occurrences of 
these risks on succeeding projects. Many of these 
requirements made their way into Agency documents, 
including design and construction (D&C) standards, or 
spacecraft or payload safety requirements. NASA began 
to depend upon the levying of these documents, as well 
as industry standards, as a means to mitigate these past 
risks. While this did not prevent all recurrence of risk, it 
did provide a repeatable method of preventing most. 
Over the succeeding years, many of the documents 
evolved to include not just requirements, but also guides 
on best practices that instructed projects not only on 
what to address, but also how to address. That is, they 
not only had to add a requirement, but also how that 
requirement should be met.  
 
Eventually, this reliance on requirements compliance 
equated to a heavy burden upon projects, potentially 
increasing the resources required to execute. In the 
current budgetary climate, projects are now being asked 
to reduce the overall requirements burden on contracts 
to improve or reduce costs and schedule, or take 
advantage of established industry reliability. At the 
same time, the Agency still needs to hold projects to a 
high expectation for safety and performance. Therefore, 
as reliance upon requirements compliance decreases, 
projects must more effectively and actively use their 
risk management processes as a means of understanding 
their uncertainties. As there is an increase in the number 
and complexity of the risks identified and eventually 
accepted by the projects, maintaining an overall 
awareness of their total sum impact on the project 
becomes more and more difficult.  
 
 
   
2. ADDRESSING AGREGATE RISK 
Every risk accepted by a project adds to its overall, or 
aggregate risk posture. Given the length and complexity 
of larger projects, such as the development of new 
spacecraft, it is difficult to maintain a level of awareness 
of what this aggregate risk impact is. Risks accepted 
early in the project, even if reviewed periodically, can 
fall under a “out of sight, out of mind” status. 
Additionally, risks associated with some project 
objective, requirement, or function are not often 
appreciated when another risk related to the same item it 
is considered.  
Many attempts have been made to keep track of and 
communicate a project’s aggregate risk, but with little 
long term implementation success. 
 
2.1 Attempts to track and communicate aggregate 
risk within NASA 
The effort to track and communicate the aggregate risk 
within a project is often associated with the creation of 
some metric. One common metric previously used on 
many projects is a count of risks. The concept behind 
this method is simple – the more risks a project has the 
greater the risk posture to NASA, and often, the more 
“attention” a project might receive from management. 
As simple as this metric for aggregate risk is, it is also 
highly inaccurate. In line with the old adage of “you get 
what you measure”, it was often in a project manager’s 
interest to under report risks. Even with the best of 
intentions, making the simple statement that one project 
has less aggregate risk than another just because it has 
fewer risks may be far off the mark. Having a large 
number of risks may indicate that one project has done a 
more extensive effort of researching their uncertainty. 
The total number of risks a project has also does not tell 
the project which risks are the more important. For this 
reason, this simple method is seldom used.  
 
Another common metric used within NASA involves 
the use of an augmented 5x5, or LxC matrix that has 
coded values for each cell. Fig. 3, below, is one example 
of such an augmented matrix used to create a combined 
score for a risk.  
 
5 10 16 20 23 25
4 7 13 18 22 24
3 4 9 15 19 21
2 2 6 11 14 17
1 1 3 5 8 12
1 2 3 4 5
Liklihood
Consequence  
Figure 3: 5x5 LxC Chart with total impact values 
  
For example, a risk with a LxC ranking of a 2x4 would 
have a risk score of 14, while a 4x5 would be 24. The 
higher the number, the higher the risk. These scores 
have been used in a number of ways.  
 
The first way this combined scoring has been used is to 
simply keep a running total for the project. This method 
relies upon the idea that a project with a high number of 
low scoring risks could have the same risk posture as 
one with a few number of high scoring risks. 
Unfortunately, this concept relies upon similar logic as 
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 the total number of risks: higher total risk score is equal 
to higher risk posture. And, as like the pervious metric, 
this paradigm also leads to under reporting of risk. 
 
One attempt to create a normalized metric that did not 
depend on the absolute score or number of risks was to 
track the average combined score of all open risks. This 
was based on a concept that it was best to track how 
well a project was working to mitigate their risks. The 
higher average combined score related that a significant 
portion of a project’s risks had yet to be mitigated, and 
therefore, there was a higher aggregate risk. The lower 
the average combined score, the higher the proportion 
of a project’s risks had been mitigated. Fig. 4 below 
displays an actual trending chart used to communicate 
average combined risk scores over a period of time. 
This particular example implies that the project’s risks 
are being mitigate and trending toward lower scores. 
This, in turn, could indicate that the project’s aggregate 
risk has dropped. 
 
 
Figure 4: Example Risk Score Trending Report 
 
This method did communicate a rough understanding of 
the average scoring of the risks, and whether or not the 
average scores were increasing or decreasing, but did 
not effectively detail an overall risk posture. For 
example, risks that were closed or accepted were 
dropped from the reporting. This method also does not 
account for the impact of adding new risks. That is, if a 
project added several new risks, all with moderate or 
lower combined scores, it would pull the average score 
down, falsely implying that the aggregate risk has also 
dropped.  
 
In hindsight, methods that rely upon absolute counts, or 
even averages, may not present an accurate estimate of 
aggregate risk. They also have the effect of 
discouraging full disclosure or inclusion of risks. What 
is needed is both a rethinking of how aggregate risk is 
considered, and how it might be tracked and 
communicated. Before considering how aggregate risk 
is considered, we will first explore some enabling 
methodology that may make its tracking and 
communication easier. 
 
3. EVOLUTION OF MBSE AND MBMA 
Over the last couple of decades, there has been a 
concerted effort to improve the overall effectiveness of 
systems engineering within projects. There is little 
debate on the impact of implementing system 
engineering on a project, with researchers such as Eric 
Honour citing potential payback of 7 to 1[1]. Systems 
engineers act as means of tying all the disparate pieces 
of the project into a coherent system. At the outset, they 
lead the development of concepts and requirements. As 
projects progress, they ensure the various systems and 
subsystems, components and testing continue to satisfy 
and fulfil the project’s objectives and requirements. In 
essence, systems engineering acts as the gatekeeper of 
the design, controlling interfaces and functions to meet 
those objectives and requirements. 
 
One of the biggest challenges to systems engineering is 
complexity. Large projects, such as the development of 
a new spacecraft, involve numerous requirements and 
interfaces. This is one measure of complexity. The net 
result is that it is more difficult for the systems 
engineering teams to be aware of everything going on 
within the system and its subsystems, and ensure good 
communication between them. New tools were needed 
to help facilitate the systems engineering role. 
 
As computing power and information infrastructure has 
improved, so to have the opportunities for better 
engineering tools. Model-Based Systems Engineering 
(MBSE) has emerged as the paradigm shift that was 
needed to better perform the role of systems engineering 
within a project. MBSE provides a means of creating 
links between all the various forms of engineering and 
management data within a project. It is not one specific 
tool, but a set of standards and practices that facilitate 
links between tools based upon the Systems Modeling 
Language, SysML. The various MBSE software 
packages can be used to create links between 
requirements management databases, CAD models, and 
analysis tools. This, then, creates ready access to 
updated information that systems engineering can use to 
identify issues such as requirements gaps or non-
compliance. They can communicate in almost-real time 
with the various subsystems as the engineering work 
proceeds.  
 
At the heart of MBSE are relationships built between 
project elements, such as objectives, requirements, 
functions, and subsystems. Systems engineers utilized a 
number of model views to create and display these 
relationships. Fig. 5 & Fig. 6 show project items that 
may be modelled into a system.  Fig. 7 then shows a 
model view showing relationships. 
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 OBJ-1 Develop a spacecraft that can support a continued crew 
pressence in orbit about Titan
OBJ-2 Deliver the spacecraft to Titan orbit by 2035
OBJ-3 Ensure capabitility with current and future visiting vehicles
…
OBJ-N The spacecraft should be delivered for $25B or less
Project Objectives
 
Figure 5: Sample project objectives 
 
OBJ-1 OBJ-2 OBJ-3 … OBJ-N
RDMT-1 Spaceraft shall include no less than 12.0 cubic meters 
of habitale volume X
RQMT-2 Spacecraft shall support a minimum of 4 crew 
members X
RQMT-3 Spaccraft shall provide radiation shielding sufficient to 
limit crew exposure to the Maximum Exposure Limit 
(MEL) defined in the Tital Program Human Systems 
Intehgration Requirements
X
RQMT-4 Spacecraft shall be compatible with the International 
Docking Standard X
RQMT-5 Spacecraft shall be compatible with existing 
commerical and NASA launch vehicles X X
Meets
Project Requirements
 
Figure 6: Sample project requirements and trace to 
project objectives. 
 
 
Figure 7: A sample of model view of project object 
relationships 
 
3.1 Model-Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) 
As the MBSE paradigm has increasingly been 
implemented across NASA and industry, Safety & 
Mission Assurance (S&MA) professionals have 
identified ways to integrate S&MA expertise into the 
models. The linkage between various collections of 
engineering data facilitated by MBSE models can enrich 
or improve the way S&MA analyses are developed. 
Data required for such S&MA analyses as Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) can be pulled 
from, and linked to, data in other sources. There are 
now add-ins for some MBSE packages that allow for 
the creation of FMEAs directly from the models. The 
modeling paradigm has also facilitated opportunities for 
S&MA professionals to engage with project teams in 
new and more effective ways. One such approach was 
detailed in a previous paper, “Early Engagement of 
Safety & Mission Assurance Expertise Using Systems 
Engineering Tools: A Risk-Based Approach to Early 
Identification of Safety and Mission Assurance 
Requirements”, by Darpel and Beckman[2]. This overall 
effort has been termed Model-Based Mission Assurance 
(MBMA).  
 
Along with improving the accuracy and cycle time of 
creating S&MA analyses, adding data from these 
analyses back in creates a more accurate and rich model. 
Engineering analysis can now be more informed based 
upon the S&MA data added. This concept can be 
applied to a more informed and effective risk 
management methodology. 
 
4. AGGREGATE RISK AND MODEL-BASED 
SYSTEM ENGINEERING 
As NASA moves to new and novel procurement 
strategies that rely more on risk assessment than on 
requirements compliance, a new approach for tracking 
and communicating aggregate risk is needed. A 
combined group of S&MA, risk management, and 
systems engineering professionals began exploring 
options for new approaches. The approach described 
within this section is the result of this effort, and will be 
piloted on one of NASA’s newest development projects. 
 
The methodology involves utilizing the data linkage 
capabilities of the MBSE model to tie risks to project 
items. This will create a way to have meaningful 
aggregation of risk that can better inform the project 
when making decisions about risk acceptance, 
prioritization of mitigation activities, or engineering 
trade studies.  
 
4.1 Methodology goals 
The effort to develop a new approach for tracking and 
communicating aggregate risk had the following goals: 
• Have a means of tracking the impact of all 
risks, open, closed, and especially accepted 
• To the greatest extent possible, make use of 
existing data sources, software, and processes, 
with a minimum of additional work or steps 
• Provide meaningful aggregation of risks that 
provides appropriate context 
 
4.2 Revisiting aggregate risk 
Earlier attempts at tracking and communicating 
aggregate risk relied on a concept of some unified 
metric that gives the total impact of all risk. As seen in 
the description of these methods, that ultimately led to 
an ineffective or faulty understanding of this aggregate 
risk. Aggregating at too high a level can be as 
meaningless as no aggregation at all. 
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 Risks are always discussed in terms of a context. Why is 
a risk important? What does it mean? Context provided 
with a risk helps teams understand all of this. Context is 
also what has been missing from the attempts to 
aggregate risk. In this usage, context provides 
meaningful grouping of risk that creates a more accurate 
picture of risk posture. Old metrics used with logical 
grouping can provide this meaningful context. What, 
then, is this logical grouping? 
 
Projects are concerned with meeting objectives and 
requirements. All risks represent an uncertainty about 
meeting these objectives and requirements. This simple 
statement provides the meaningful grouping being 
sought. The data linkages enabled by MBSE provides 
the means to create ties between risks and the item at 
risk. Once these links are there, it becomes possible for 
projects to consider all the risks associated with any 
item, objectives, requirements, functions, or subsystems. 
The is a more meaningful risk aggregation as it allows 
teams to make more informed decisions about a risk, as 
they understand all factors putting that item at risk. 
 
In short, projects must consider aggregate risk not as 
some sum total of all risks to the project, but as total 
impacts to some project object. The question should not 
be what is the total risk the project, but what is the total 
risk to meeting each project objective or requirement. 
That is a question that is actionable.  
 
4.3 Use of existing risk management process 
The proposed method makes use of the project’s 
existing risk management process with minor additions. 
The project periodically holds workshops to identify 
risks, although they can be identified at any time. These 
risks are researched, validated, and discussed at bi-
weekly risk reviews. Part of the research and validation 
process includes trying to assign the likelihood and 
consequence scores. There are four consequence scores, 
Cost, Schedule, Technical, and Safety. Any given risk 
may have one or more consequence. That portion of the 
process remains, including the use of a legacy database 
to house and manage the risk data.  
 
For this new method, project teams are asked to identify 
not only what the consequences are, but also what 
project item it is a consequence to. That is, detail which 
item is at risk of not being met should the risk be 
realized. Again, these are items in the MBSE model, 
such as project objectives, requirements, functions, or 
subsystems, in the hierarchy described in section 3. 
Where possible, risks should be assigned to the lowest 
level of this hierarchy. This allows the greatest amount 
of aggregation options that also provides a meaning 
context.  
 
Risk ID: TITAN-001 Risk Title: POC: B. Easy Risk Owner:
Status:
# Actionee ECD Like. Tech. Safety Sched. Cost Score
0 5 4 5 4 25
1 B. Easy 10/1/2019 4 4 5 4 24
2 D. Warbucks 11/15/2019 3 4 4 3 21
3 B. Easy 9/30/2021 2 2 2 3 11
4 B. Easy 9/30/2024 1 2 2 3 5
The currently available technology for CO2 removal has insufificent margins to meet the needs of a four-person crew. New technology is under 
development, but may not meet the Tital Project's launch schedule. Without some additional development or support, it may not be possible to 
meet crew levels and impact the planned operations and science for the outpost.
Risk has been reivewed at the 3/25/19 risk review, and scores and impacts validated
RQMT-2: Spacecraft shall support a minimum of 4 crew members
OBJ-2: Deliver the spacecraft to Titan orbit by 2035
CO2-Max testing on LEO-Hotel module
Jane Manager
Risk Intial Scoring and Mitigation Plans
Risk Impacts:
Success Criteria
Verify that the CO2-Max 
requirements would 
meet program needs
Line item for CO2-Max 
accerleation added to 
approved program 
budget
Receive EDU for testing
Receive performance 
data
Secure funding for CO2-Max program 
development acceleration
CO2-Max EDU for integration testing
Task Decsription
Intial Scoring, validated 3/25/2019
Analyze  options for accerlations of CO2-
Max progam
Status Date: 4/2/2019
CO2 Removal Capability
Risk Statement:
Context:
Given the current CO2 removal technoology options would support 3 crew members for a continual stay, there is a possibility that enhanced 
capabilities will not be ready to support 4 crew,  and impact launch shcedule.
 
Figure 8: Example project risk with risk impacts added 
 
Further actions should also be per the typical risk 
management process, including potential mitigation 
steps as well as their assumed impact on the LxC 
scoring.  
 
4.4 Adding risk to the MBSE model 
Once a project risk has been identified and vetted, a risk 
item is added to the MBSE model that includes, at a 
minimum, the following information: 
• Risk ID (unique ID from risk database) 
• Risk Title 
• Status (Open, Closed, Accepted) 
• Current Likelihood Score 
• Current Consequence Score 
o Budget 
o Schedule 
o Technical 
o Safety 
• Current Risk Matrix Score (1-25) 
• Assumed Ending Likelihood Score (after 
mitigation complete) 
• Assumed Ending Consequence Scores (after 
mitigation complete) 
o Budget 
o Schedule 
o Technical 
o Safety 
• Assumed Ending Risk Matrix Score (1-25) 
• Link to risk record in database 
 
 
Figure 9: Example Risk Profile from a MagicDraw 
MBSE model 
 
6
 Once added into the model, a “Risk To” relationship is 
created between it and any project object that it is 
related to. Any given risk may impact more than one 
project object, so multiple “Risk To” relationships are 
allowed. 
 
 
Figure 10: Example risk relationships with other 
project objects 
 
Fig. 10 shows a notional model view with links between 
a project risk, TITAN-001, a project objective, OBJ-2, 
and project requirement, RQMT-002. If a user requests 
a list of all risks impacting either OBJ-2 or RQMT-002, 
TITAN-001 will be included. In addition, because there 
is already a link between RQMT-002 and project 
objective, OBJ-1, any like search for risks against OBJ-
1 will also include TITAN-001. That is to say that as 
TITAN-001 is a risk to meeting RQMT-002, and 
RQMT-002 is a means of meeting OBJ-1, by extension 
it means that TITAN-001 is a risk to meeting OBJ-1.  
 
Whenever risks are updated, and there are score or 
status changes, these attributes are updated within the 
model to reflect the current states. 
 
4.4 Risk reports from MBSE model informing 
decsions 
Risk discussions with resulting decisions occur at many 
times throughout the project lifecycle. With the risks 
being added to the MBSE model and linked to other 
project objects, reports can be run that will better inform 
these decisions. These reports can detail all the risks 
associated with a given project object and provide roll 
up scores based upon current and assumed ending 
values for likelihood, consequence, and risk matrix 
scoring.  
 
Project Object:
Current Score 63 Expected Ending Score 30
ID Current Score End Score Status
TITAN-001 25 5 Open
TITAN-012 19 6 Open
TITAN-017 11 11 Accepted
TITAN-032 8 8 Closed
CO-2 Removal Capability
Habitable volume mass
Crew exercise volume
Radiation safe haven
Title
Titan Program Linked Risk Report
RQMT-002: Spacecraft shall support  aminimum of 4 crew 
members
 
Figure 11: Example risk report for a project object 
 
At some point in the project’s life cycle, a team may be 
considering whether or not to accept a risk, or continue 
to work towards mitigation. This risk in question is 
related to a project requirement, R1. This requirement, in 
turn, is related to meeting the project objective, O1. A 
report is run that lists all the risks associated with R1, 
including their associated scores, along with an 
aggregate set of roll up scores. The same is done for O1. 
The team can then see the incremental impact of 
accepting the risk as is, and if that impact warrants 
further investment into mitigation attempts.  
 
At project milestone reviews, teams often evaluate the 
status of project objects, such as objectives and 
requirements. These evaluations can be further 
enhanced with the linked risk information provided by 
the model reports.  
 
In an attempt to prevent missteps of previous methods, 
projects should be cautious in the use of the combined 
scores. They are useful only in that they provide the 
project a means to compare risk areas to each other, not 
as an absolute judgement of aggregate risk. The real 
value in this method is that it facilitates the team’s 
ability to see all the risks impacting an object. It is not 
the score, but the knowledge of how other risks have 
impacted an item that is valuable.  
 
As an example, in Fig. 11, the example report of all 
risks related to a requirement show a total current score 
of 63, and potential ending score of 30. It is not the 
absolute numbers that may be the most helpful, but the 
progress that is possible with the planned mitigations. 
Or, if more resources towards any of the risks is 
warranted if there is not enough progress.  
 
Requirement Linked Risks Current Score Planned End Score
RQMT-001 4 75 25
RQMT-002 4 63 30
RQMT-003 1 15 5
RQMT-004 8 140 100
RQMT-005 3 45 30
RQMT-006 7 105 40
Project Requirements Risk Report
 
Figure 12: Risks by Project Requirements Summary 
 
Another way to utilize these reports is by running a list 
of all objectives or requirements and their associated 
scores to use when considering prioritization of efforts. 
Fig. 12 shows a notional report of risks linked to a 
project’s requirements. The report includes a count of 
the linked risks and their resulting current and planned 
ending combined scores. A team could look at RQMT-
004 and see that only a minor score reduction is 
currently planned. It could be in the project’s interest to 
investigate further mitigations for the risks linked to that 
requirement to bring about more reduction in the 
aggregate risk.  
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 5. FUTURE WORK 
The paper team is currently exploring the 
implementation specifics involved with this new 
methodology for use on a NASA development project. 
Efforts will begin with mostly manual efforts to 
replicate risk data in the MBSE  model. The focus will 
be on the process itself, and how well it informs the 
project team. As the opportunities arise to create 
transfers of data between the MBSE package in use, and 
the current risk database, those links will be tried and 
tested. 
 
Second, the work to link risk into the MBSE model can 
be extended to provide a similar situational awareness 
for hazards. In fact, the potential for including hazards 
into the MBSE models surpasses even that of the risks, 
including such information as fault trees and failure 
modes. The team will be exploring ways to include 
hazards into the models and their utility in assisting 
projects in making more informed decisions.  
 
6. SUMMARY 
A new method for understanding and communicating 
aggregate risk, based upon relationships between the 
risk and the item it impacts, facilitated by the advent of 
the MBSE modeling tools, will yield more informed 
decisions. Project teams that consider the total impact of 
all risks against an item, such as an objective or 
requirement, when evaluating a risk will have a better 
understanding of the aggregate risk. Risks added to the 
MBSE model, with relationships between them and the 
items they impact, allow for this reporting to be done at 
any time.  
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